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The subject of this work deals with the right of every person, provided in Article 6.1 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, to a hearing within a reasonable time, 
specifically in criminal proceedings. This right, which in Spain enjoys constitutional 
protection in Article 24.2 and gives rise to a reduction of the penalty through the 
application of a mitigating circumstance, provided in article 21.6 of the Criminal Code, 
also constitutes an object of protection in the Philippines through Article III Section 14 
of its Constitution or through the Speedy Trial Act, among other regulations. 
The legal configuration of this right in both legal systems has been specially 
conditioned by case-law but in different senses. Thus, on the one hand, in Spanish law 
the mitigation applicable to the penalty was introduced into the Criminal Code in 2010 
on the basis of a consolidated case-law practice, influenced by the requirements 
contained in the judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, which pay 
attention to the circumstances of the specific case, instead of requiring predetermined 
deadlines. On the other hand, the protection of this right in the Philippine Law, and in 
particular, the case-law of the Supreme Court, has closely followed the case-law of the 
United States to interpret the constitutional right to speedy trial, in addition to 
constitutionally demanding deadlines which the courts must respect. 
In conclusion, the present paper intends to compare the two systems, to firstly determine 
whether in both cases this issue is addressed from the same approach, since in the 
Spanish case the term used is ‘reasonable time’ while in the Filipino ‘speedy trial’; 
secondly, to study the requirements of both legal systems; and, thirdly, to evaluate them 
to consider whether, in both cases, the protection of this procedural guarantee of great 
relevance is ensured. 
 
